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This paper provides an asymmetric information framework for
understanding the nature of financial crises. It provides the
following precise definition of a financial crisis: A financial
crisis is a disruption to financial markets in which adverse
selection and moral hazard problems become much worse, so that
financial markets are unable to efficiently channel funds to
those who have the most productive investment opportunities. As
a result, a financial crisis can drive the economy away from an
equilibrium with high output in which financial markets perform
well to one in which output declines sharply. The asymmetric
information framework explains the patterns in the data and many
features of these crises which are otherwise hard to explain. It
indicates that financial crises have effects over and above those
resulting from bank panics and therefore provides a rationale for
an expanded lender-of-last resort role for the central bank in
which the central bank uses the discount window to provide





New York, NY 10027
and NBERIntroduction
Ahealthy and vibrant economy requires a financial system that moves funds to
economic agents who have the most productive investment opportunities.
Financial crises interfere with this process because they can drive the economy
away from an equilibrium with high output in which financial markets perform
well to one in which output declines sharply because the financial system is unable
to channel funds to those with the best investment opportunities. This paper shows
how this occurs by outlining an asymmetric information framework for understand-
ing the precise nature of financial crises.
EarlierViews of Financial Crises
Upuntil recently, views of financial crises in the literature have split into two
polar camps, those associated with monetarists versus a more eclectic view put
forward by Charles Kindleberger and Hyman Minsky. Monetarists beginning with
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) have linked financial crises with banking panics.
They stress the importance of banking panics because they view them as a major
source of contractions in the money supply which, in turn, have lead to severe
contractions in aggregate economic activity in the United States. Monetarists do
not view as real financial crises events in which, despite a sharp decline in asset
prices and a rise in business failures, there is no potential for a banking panic and
a resulting sharp decline in the money supply. Indeed, Schwartz (1986) charac-
terizes these situations as "pseudo financial crises". Government intervention in
a pseudo-financial crisis is unnecessary and can indeed be harmful since it leads
to a decrease in economic efficiency because firms that deserve to fail are bailed
out or because it results in excessive money growth that stimulates inflation.
An opposite view of financial crises is outlined by Kindleberger (1978) and
Minsky (1972) who have a much broader definition of what constitutes a real
financial crisis than monetarists. In their view, financial crises either involve
sharp declines in asset prices, failures of both large financial and nonfinancial
firms, deflations or disinflations, disruptions in foreign exchange markets, or some
combination of all of these. Since they perceive any of these disturbances as2
having potential serious consequences for the aggregate economy, they advocate
a much expanded role for government intervention when a financial crisis, broadly
defined, occurs.
One problem with the Kindleberger-Minsky view of financial crises is that
it does not supply a rigorous theory of what characterizes a financial crisis, and
it thus lends itself to being used too broadly as a justification for government
interventions that might not be beneficial for the economy. Indeed, this is the
basis of Schwartz's (1986) attack on the Kindleberger-Minsky view. On the other
hand, the monetarist view of financial crises is extremely narrow because it only
focuses on bank panics and their affect on the money supply.
AsymmetricInformation and Financial Structure
Therecent literature on asymmetric information and financial structure, which has
been excellently surveyed recently by Gertler (1988a), on the other hand does
provide a broader view of the nature of financial crises, but it supplies a theory
which does not automatically justify government interventions when there is a
sharp drop in wealth as the Kindleberger-Minsky view might. The review of the
literature here provides a framework which can be used to understand financial
crises in the following section.
Transactions that take place in financial markets are subject to asymmetric
information in which one party often does not know all that he or she needs to
know about the other party to make correct decisions. For example, a borrower
who takes out a loan usually has better information about the potential returns and
risk associated with the investment projects he plans to undertake than does the
lender. Asymmetric information creates problems in the financial system in two
basic ways: before the transaction is entered into (adverse selection) and after the
transaction is entered into (moral hazard).
Adverse selection in financial markets occurs when the potential borrowers
who are the most likely to produce an undesirable (adverse) outcome --thebad
credit risks --arethe ones most likely to be selected. Since adverse selection
makes it more likely that loans might be made to bad credit risks, lenders may3
decide not to make any loans even though there are good credit risks in the
marketplace. This outcome is a feature of the classic "lemons problem" analysis
first described by Ackerloff (1970). As pointed out by Myers and Majiuf (1984)
and Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (1984), a lemons problem occurs in the debt
and equity markets when lenders have trouble determining whether a lender is a
good risk (he has good investment opportunities with low risk) or, alternatively,
is a bad risk (he has poorer investment projects with high risk). In this situation,
a lender will only be willing to pay a price for a security that reflects the average
quality of firms issuing the securities --aprice below fair market value for high-
quality firms, but above fair market value for low-quality firms. The owners or
managers of a high-quality firm that know their quality then alsoknow that their
securities are undervalued and will not want to sell them in the market. On the
other hand, the only firms willing to sell their securities will be low-quality firms
because they know that the price of their securities is greater than their value.
Since asymmetric information prevents investors from determining whether some
firms are high quality, these firms will not issue securities and credit markets will
not work well since many projects with a positive net present value will not be
undertaken.
As demonstrated by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), asymmetric information and
the resulting adverse selection problem also leads to credit rationing in which some
borrowers are denied loans even when they are willing to pay a higher interest
rate. This occurs because individuals and firms with the riskiest investment
projects are exactly those who are willing to pay the highest interest rates since if
the high-risk investment succeeds, they will be the main beneficiaries. Thus a
higher interest rate leads to even greater adverse selection; that is, it increases the
likelihood that the bank is lending to a bad credit risk. If the lender cannot
discriminate who are the borrowers with the riskier investment projects, it may
want to cut down the number of loans it makes, which causes the supply of loans
to decrease with the higher interest rate rather than decrease. Thus, even if there
is an excess demand for loans, a higher interest rate will not be able to equilibrate
the market because additional increases in the interest rate will only decrease the
supply of loans and make the excess demand for loans increase even further.
Indeed, as Mankiw (1986) has demonstrated, a small rise in the riskiess interest4
rate can lead to a very large decrease in lending and even a possible collapse in
the market.'
Moral hazard in financial markets occurs after a loan is extended when the
lender is subjected to the hazard that the borrower might engage in activities that
are undesirable (immoral) from the lender's point of view, because they increase
the probability of default. Moral hazard arises as a result of asymmetric informa-
tion since the lender's lack of knowledge about the borrower's activities enables
the borrower to engage in moral hazard. However, asymmetric information is not
the only source of the moral hazard problem. Moral hazard can also occur
because high enforcement costs might make it too costly for the lender to prevent
moral hazard even when the lender is fully informed about the borrower's
activities.
Moral hazard occurs because the borrower has incentives to invest in
projects with high risk in which the borrower does well if the project succeeds but
the lender bears most of the loss if the project fails. Also the borrower has
incentives to misallocate funds for his own personal use, to shirk and just not work
very hard, or to undertake investment in unprofitable projects that increase his
power or stature. The conflict of interest between the borrower and lender
stemming from moral hazard (the agency problem) implies that many lenders will
decide that they would rather not make loans, so that lending and investment will
be at suboptimal levels.
One way that financial markets can solve the problems created by
asymmetric information is the use of collateral. Collateral reduces the consequenc-
es of adverse selection or moral hazard because it reduces the lender's losses in
the case of a default, If a borrower defaults on a loan, the lender can take title to
the collateral and sell it to make up for the losses on the loan. Thus if the
collateral is of good enough quality, then the fact that there is asymmetric
information between borrower and lender is no longer as important since the loss
incurred by the lender if the loan defaults is substantially reduced.
'Jaffee and Russell (1976) have demonstrated a second type of credit rationing in which
lenders make loans but limit their size to less than the borrower may want. This occurs because
the larger the loan, the greater are moral hazard incentives for the borrower to engage in
activities that make it less likely that the loan will be repaid.5
Networth performs a similar role to collateral since if a firm has high net
worth, then even if it defaults on its debt payments as a result of poor investments,
the lender can take title to the firm's net worth, sell it off, and use the proceeds
to recoup some of the losses from the loan. (Note that in a multi-period context,
Gertler (1988b) shows that the concept of a borrower's net worth can be
broadened to include the discounted value of future profits which is reflected in the
market value of the borrowing firm.) In addition, the more net worth a firm has
in the first place, the less likely it is to default because the firm has a cushion of
assets that it can use to pay off its loans. High net worth also directly decreases
the incentives for borrowers to commit moral hazard because they now have more
at stake, and thus more to lose, if they default on their loans. Hence, when firms
seeking credit have high net worth, the consequences of adverse selection and
moral hazard are less important and lenders will be more willing to make loans.
Another way that financial markets can solve asymmetric information
problems is through the private production and sale of information that allows
lenders to have full information about the individuals or firms who need to finance
their investment activities. However, the free-rider problem, in which people who
do not pay for information can take advantage (free-ride off) of the information
that others pay for, suggests that the private sale of information will only be a
partial solution to the adverse selection and moral hazard problems. If some
investors pay for information that tells them which securities are undervalued and
therefore buy their securities, other investors who have not paid for this
information can buy right along with the well-informed investors. If enough free-
riding investors do this, the increased demand for the undervalued securities will
cause their low price to be bid up immediately to reflect the securities' true value.
As a result of all these free riders, investors who have paid for information will
no longer be able to buy the securities for less than their true value. Once these
investors realize that they cannot earn extra returns by purchasing this information,
they will no longer be willing to purchase it. The weakened ability of private
firms to profit from selling information will mean that less information is produced
in the financial markets and so the adverse selection problem will continue to be
severe.
The free-rider problem also makes it less likely that securities markets can6
reduce moral hazard in financial markets. Monitoring and enforcement of
restrictive covenants (provisions in debt contracts that restrict and specify certain
activities of the borrower) is one method for reducing moral hazard. By
monitoring a borrower's activities to see whether he is complying with the
restrictive covenants and enforcing the covenants if he is not, lenders can prevent
borrowers from taking on risk at their expense. However, because monitoring and
enforcement of restrictive covenants are costly, the free-rider problem discourages
this kind of activity in bond markets. If some investors know that other bond
holders are monitoring and enforcing the restrictive covenants, then they can free
ride on the other bond holders' monitoring and enforcement. Once these other
bond holders realize that they can do the same thing, they also may stop their
monitoring and enforcement activities, with the result that not enough resources
are devoted to monitoring and enforcement. The outcome is that moral hazard
continues to be a severe problem for marketable debt.
An important feature of financial markets that helps reduce the free-rider
problem so that asymmetric information problems are reduced is the existence of
financial intermediaries that make private loans, the most important of which are
banks. Banks help reduce adverse selection problems in financial markets by
becoming experts in the production of information about firms so that they can sort
out good credit risks from bad ones. Then they can acquire funds from depositors
and lend them to good firms. Banks' advantages in information collection
activities are also enhanced by their ability to engage in long-term customer
relationships and to issue loans using lines of credit arrangements. Because the
bank is able to lend mostly to good firms, it is able to earn a higher return on its
loans, than the interest it has to pay its depositors. As a result, the bank is able to
earn a profit, which allows it to engage in the information production activity. An
important element in the ability of a bank to profit from the information it
produces is that it avoids the free-rider problem by primarily making private loans.
Because a private loan is not traded, other investors cannot free ride off the bank
and bid up the loan's price, thus preventing the bank from profiting from its
information production activities.
Because financial intermediaries such as banks primarily make private loans,
no one else can free ride off their monitoring and enforcement activities. The7
intermediary making private loans thus receives the benefits of monitoring and
enforcement of restrictive covenants and will work to shrink the moral hazard
problem inherent in debt contracts. Banks also have advantages in reducing moral
hazard because, as demonstrated by Diamond (1984), they can engage in lower
cost monitoring than individuals, and because, as pointed out by Stiglitz and Weiss
(1983), they have advantages in enforcement of restrictive covenants since they can
use the threat of cutting off lending in the future to improve borrower's behavior.
The existence of the free-rider problem and banks' natural advantages in reducing
moral hazard explain why banks have such an important role in financial markets
of channelling funds to those with productive investment opportunities.
UnderstandingFinancial Crises
Theasymmetric information analysis outlined here provides a framework
for understanding how a disruption in financial markets can cause a downturn in
aggregate economic activity. It also provides the following more precise definition
of what a financial crisis is. A financial crisis is a disruption to financial markets
in which adverse selection and moral hazard problems become much worse, so
that financial markets are unable to efficiently channel funds to those who have the
most productive investment opportunities. A financial crisis thus results in the
inability of financial markets to function efficiently, which leads to a sharp
contraction in economic activity. Now we will take a more detailed look at how
a financial crisis comes about and causes a decline in economic activity.
Factors Causing Financial Crises
Five factors in the economic environment can lead to substantial worsening
of adverse selection and moral hazard in financial markets, which then cause a
financial crisis and shift the economy from an equilibrium with high output to one
with low output because the financial system is unable to channel funds to those
with the best investment opportunities. The factors causing financial crises are:8
(1) increases in interest rates, (2) stock market declines, (3)increases in uncertain-
ty, (4) bank panics, and (5) unanticipateddeclines in the aggregate price level.
Increases in Interest Rates. As we have seen, individuals and firmswith the
riskiest investment projects are exactly those who are willing to pay the highest
interest rates.If market interest rates are driven up sufficiently, because of
increased demand for credit or because of a decline in the money supply, good
credit risks are less likely to want to borrow while bad credit risks are still willing
to borrow. Because of the resulting increase in adverse selection,lenders will no
longer want to make loans, possibly leading to a steepdecline in lending which
will lead to a substantial decline in investment and aggregate economic activity.
Stock Market Declines.As emphasized by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988),
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), and Calomiris and Hubbard (1990), a sharpdecline
in the stock market, as in a stock market crash, can increase adverse selectionand
moral hazard problems in financial markets because it leads to a largedecline in
the market value of firms' net worth. (Note that this decline in asset valuescould
either occur because of expectations of lower future income streams fromthese
assets or because of a rise in market interest rates whichlowers the present
discounted value of future income streams.) The decline in net worth as aresult
of a stock market decline makes lenders less willing to lend because, as wehave
seen, the net worth of firms has a similarrole to collateral, and when the value of
collateral declines, it provides less protection to lenders so that losses from loans
are likely to be more severe. Because lenders are nowless protected against the
consequences of adverse selection, they decreasetheir lending, which in turn
causes investment and aggregate output to decline.
In addition, the decline in corporate net worth as a result of a stock market
decline increases moral hazard incentives for borrowing firms to make risky
investments because these firms now have less to lose if their investments go sour.
The resulting increase in moral hazard makes lending less attractive, providing
another reason why a stock market decline and hence a decline in net worthleads9
to decreased lending and economic activity.
Increases in Uncertainty. A dramatic increase in uncertainty in financial
markets, due perhaps to the failure of a prominent financial or non-financial
institution, a recession, or a stock market crash, makes it harder for lenders to
screen out good from bad credit risks. The resulting inability of lenders to solve
the adverse selection problem, makes them less willing to lend, leading to a
decline in lending, investment and aggregate activity.
Bank Panics. As we have seen, banks perform an important financial
intermediation role by engaging in information producing activities that facilitate
productive investment for the economy. Thus as described by Bernanke (1983),
a financial crisis which results in a bank panic, the simultaneous failure of many
banks, reduces the amount of financial intermediation undertaken by banks, and
will thus lead to a decline in investment and aggregate economic activity.
The source of a bank panic is again asymmetric information. In a panic
depositors, fearing the safety of their deposits, withdraw them from the banking
system, causing a contraction in loans and a multiple contraction in deposits,
which then causes banks to fail. Asymmetric information is critical to this process
because depositors rush to make withdrawals from solvent as well as insolvent
banks since they cannot distinguish between them. Furthermore, banks' desire to
protect themselves from possible deposit outflows leads them to increase their
reserves relative to deposits, which also produces a contraction in loans and
deposits and promotes other bank failures. The net result is that a bank panic
reduces the funds available to banks to make loans and the cost of financial inter-
mediation rises, causing a reduction in investment and a decline in aggregate
economic activity.
A bank panic also can lead to higher interest rates because the panic results
in decreasing liquidity since the supply of funds to borrowers has been curtailed.
As we have seen, this rise in interest rates directly increases adverse selection
problems in credit markets and also can reduce the value of firms' net worth,
which also increases adverse selection as well as agency problems. Thus, since10
bank panics have the secondary effect of increasing adverse selection and agency
problems in financial markets, bank panics lead to economic contraction through
these channels as well.
Unanticipated Declines in the Price LevelUnanticipated declines in the price
level also decrease the net worth of firms. Because debt payments are contractual-
ly fixed in nominal terms, an unanticipated decline in the price level raises the
value of firms' liabilities in real terms (increases the burden of the debt), but does
not raise the real value of firms' assets. The result is that net worth in real terms
declines. A sharp drop in the price level, therefore causes a substantial decline in
real net worth and an increase in adverse selection and moral hazard problems
facing lenders. The resulting increase in adverse selection and agency problems
causes a decline in investment and economic activity.2
Anatomyof a Financial Crisis
Nowthat we have examined the five factors above that can interfere with
the efficient functioning of financial markets, we are ready to describe the anatomy
of a financial crisis. Figure 1 provides a diagrammatic exposition of the sequence
of events that occur during a financial crisis, which are outlined below.
Most financial crises in the U.S. have begun with a sharp rise in interest
rates, a stock market crash and an increase in uncertainty resulting from a failure
of major financial or non-financial firms (the Ohio Life Insurance & Trust Co. in
1857, the Northern Pacific Railroad and Jay Cooke & Co. in 1873, Grant & Ward
in 1884, the National Cordage Co. in 1893, the Knickerbocker Trust Company in
1907, and the Bank of United States in 1930.) During these crises the increase in
uncertainty, the rise in interest rates and the stock market crash increased the
severity of adverse selection problems in credit markets, while the decline in net
worth stemming from the stock market crash also increased moral hazard
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Figure 1
Sequence of Events in a Financial Crisis
The sequence of events above the dashed line are those that occur in almost all financial crises,









problems. The increase in adverse selection and moral hazard problems made it
less attractive for lenders to lend and led to a decline in investment and aggregate
economic activity.
Because of the worsening business conditions and uncertainty about their
bank's health, depositors now began to withdraw their funds from banks because
they worried that the banks might go broke. The resulting bank panic, in which
the number of banks declined, raised interest rates even further and decreased the
amount of financial intermediation by banks. The resulting worsening of the
problems created by adverse selection and moral hazard led to further economic
contraction.
Finally, there would be a sorting out of insolvent (truly bankrupt) firms
from healthy firms by bankruptcy proceedings and the 'same process would occur
for banks, often with the help of public and private authorities. Once this sorting
out was complete, uncertainty in financial markets would decline, the stock market
would undergo a recovery, and interest rates would fall. The result would then
be a diminution in adverse selection and moral hazard problems and the financial
crisis would subside. With the financial markets able to operate well again, the
stage would be set for the recovery of the economy.
If, however, the economic downturn led to a sharp decline in prices, the
recovery process might get short-circuited. In this situation described by Irving
Fisher (1933) as a debt-deflation, the substantial decline in the price level leads to
a further deterioration in firms' net worth because of the increased burden of
indebtedness. If debt-deflation sets in, as occurred for example during the Great
Depression, the adverse selection and moral hazard problems continue to increase
so that lending, investment spending and aggregate economic activity remain
depressed for a long time.
The monetarist literature adds an additional channel for how financial crises
that involve bank panics could lead to a severe downturn in the aggregate
economy. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) document how bank panics in the
United States led to sharp contractions in the money supply as a result of
depositors movement out of deposits into currency and banks movement out of
loans into reserves. These contractions in the money supply then are seen as being
responsible for substantial declines in economic activity and the price level.12
The asymmetric information view of financial crises outlined here is
complementary to the inonetarist view of the importance of bank panics to
contractions in economic activity. Indeed, the asymmetric information approach
provides a transmission mechanism for how a decline in the money supply leads
to a decline in aggregate economic activity. The debt-deflation that stems from a
decline in the money supply increases adverse selection and moral hazard problems
which cause a decline in investment and aggregate economic activity. However,
the asymmetric information approach suggests that the impact of a decline in the
money supply as a result of a financial crisisis not the whole story of why
financial crises affect the aggregate economy. Instead it takes a much broader
view of what a financial crisis is and puts a very different light on when a financial
crisis is real rather than a pseudo-crisis.
HistoricalEvidence
Inexamining the historical evidence on financial crisis, our analysis suggests that
we should look at stock prices, interest rates, instances of major failures of
financial and nonfinancial institutions, and the aggregate price level when we
analyze individual episodes of financial crisis. Asymmetric information analysis
suggests an additional piece of information that can help us assess the natureof a
particular financial crisis: the spread between interest rates for low and high-
quality borrowers. When adverse selection increases in financial markets during
a financial crisis there should be a large rise in interest rates to borrowersfor
which there is substantial difficulty in obtaining reliable information about their
characteristics, that is, for which there is a serious asymmetric information
problem. On the other hand, there would be a much smaller effect on interest
rates to borrowers for which there is almost no asymmetric information problem
because it is easy to obtain information about their characteristics. Since low-
quality borrowers are more likely to be firms for which information about their
characteristics is difficult to obtain, while high-quality borrowers are more likely
to be ones for which the asymmetric information problem is least severe, a rise in
the spread between interest rates for low and high-quality borrowers can provide13
information on when the adverse selection problem becomes more severe in debt
markets.
The spread between interest rates for low and high-quality borrowers can
also provide information about whether moral hazard problems in financial markets
are increasing during a financial crisis. High-quality borrowers with initially high
net worth are much less likely to engage in moral hazard when a stock market
crash or a deflationary shock occurs because they still will have sufficient net
worth so that they continue to have much to lose if they default on their debts. On
the other hand, when a stock market crash or a deflationary shock occurs, low-
quality borrowers with initially low net worth will now have so little net worth left
that their incentives to commit moral hazard will be greatly increased. The
outcome is that a deflationary shock or a stock market crash which increases moral
hazard problems in debt markets should result in a greater increase in interest rates
for low-quality borrowers than for high-quality borrowers. An increase in the
interest rate spread for low versus high-quality borrowers thus suggests that moral
hazard as well as adverse selection problems are increasing in financial markets.
Mishkin (1991) examines the spread between interest rates on low and high-
quality borrowers as well as the other variables mentioned above for episodes of
financial crises from 1857 to 1940 in the United States and the following facts
emerge.
1. With the same exception in 1873, stock prices decline and the spread
between interest rates for low and high-quality borrowers rises before
the onset of the panic.
2. Many panics seem to have features of a liquidity crisis in which there
are substantial increases in interest rates before the panic.
3. The onset of many panics follows a major failure of a financial
institution, not necessarily a bank. Furthermore this failure is often the
result of financial difficulties experienced by a nonfinancial corporation.
4. With one exception in 1873, financial panics always occurred after the
onset of a recession.
5. The rise in the interest rate spread associated with a panic is typically
soon followed by a decline. However, in several cases, most notably14
after the 1873 panic, the 1907 panic and the Great Depression, the
interest rate spread rises again when there is deflation and a severe
recession.
6. The most severe financial crises are associated with severe economic
contractions. The most severe panic episodes are in 1857, 1873, 1893,
1907 and 1930-33, while 1857-58, 1873-79, 1893-94, 1907-08, and
1929-33 are all considered to be among the most severe economic
contractions.
7. Although stock market crashes often appear to be a major factor in
creating a financial crisis, this is not always the case. Both the stock
market crash in October 1929 and in May 1940 did not have appreciable
effects on the interest rate spread. Therefore, the evidence that there
was a serious disruption in financial markets after these crashes is weak.
There are several conclusions that can be drawn from the facts listed above.
The timing and the pattern of the data in the episodes studied here seem to fit an
asymmetric information interpretation of financial crises. Rather than starting with
bank panics, most of the financial crises begin with a rise in interest rates, a stock
market crash and the widening of the interest rate spread. Furthermore, a finan-
cial panic frequently is immediately preceded by a major failure of a financial firm
and the beginning of the recession which increases uncertainty in the marketplace.
The increase in uncertainty and the rise in interest rates magnify the adverse
selection problem in the credit markets, while the decline in the stock market
increases adverse selection and moral hazard problems, both of which are reflected
in the rise in the spread between interest rates for low and high-quality borrowers.
The increase in adverse selection and moral hazard problems would then lead to
a decline in investment activity and aggregate economic activity.
Only after these problems have manifested themselves in financial markets
do we find that a bank panic occurs. The bank panic raises interest rates further,
causes the stock market to decline even more and worsens adverse selection and
moral hazard as manifested by a further widening of the spread between interest
rates for low versus high-quality borrowers.
Finally, the sorting out of solvent from insolvent firms and banks occurs.15
the crisis would then subside, the stock market undergoes a recovery, interest rates
would fall, and if economic uncertainty and deflation were not too severe, adverse
selection and agency problems would diminish, leading to a decline in the interest
rate spread between low and high-quality borrowers. In episodes in which a
substantial deflation does not occur we then expect and do see a rapid decline in
the spread between interest rates for low versus high-quality borrowers.
However, in episodes in which a substantial deflation sets in, we see
evidence of a debt-deflation process in which there is a prolonged continuation of
a large spread between interest rates for low and high-quality borrowers. It is
exactly in these episodes that we see aggregate economic activity depressed for a
prolonged period of time.
The asymmetric information analysis of financial crises explains the events
and their timing in these episodes more effectively than the monetarist view
because a monetarist view does not explain why the spread between interest rates
for low and high-quality borrowers rises dramatically before the panic and then
declines quickly after the panic subsides. However, the asymmetric information
story does not rule out important consequences on aggregate economic activity
from the decline in the money supply that a banking panic produces. It just
suggests that there is more to the story of a financial crisis than its affects on the
money supply.
A monetarist explanation of financial crises is also not able to explain the
timing of banking panics, that is, why they occurred when they did. An
asymmetric information analysis, on the other hand, sees bank panics as a
consequence of high interest rates, a major failure of a corporation, or weak
business conditions stemming from a recession which makes depositors nervous
about the health of banks that hold their deposits. Since depositors cannot easily
screen out good from bad banks, when this adverse aggregate information appears,
they worry about potential losses on their deposits and withdraw funds from the
banking system, precipitating a panic. The facts about the crisis episodes dis-
cussed in Mishkin (1991) are thus entirely consistent with Gorton's (1987) view
that bank panics are predictable.16
Implicationsfor Policymaking
Animportant issue for monetary policymakers is when they should engage
in a lender-of-last-resort role.The traditional lender-of-last-resort role, as
originally developed by Thornton (1802) and Bagehot (1873), requires the central
bank to lend freely to banks at a penalty rate when a bank panic is in the offing.
In recent years the Federal Reserve System has engaged in activities that go well
beyond the traditional role of a lender of last resort. The Federal Reserve's
perception that the financial system is more fragile in recent years because of
increased leverage in both the financial and nonfinancial sectors has encouraged
it to provide liquidity to the economy in the face of financial disturbances outside
of the banking system, as occurred in the commercial paper market immediately
after the Penn Central bankruptcy in June of 1970 or after the "Black Monday"
stock market crash in 1987. Is this expanded lender-of-last-resort role beneficial
for the economy? Under what conditions should the central bank stand ready to
be a lender of last resort and how should it perform this role?
A monetarist view of financial disturbances sees them as important only if
they produce banking panics which leads to a decline in the money supply. With
this view, the lender of last resort role should be very a narrow one•: the central
bank should only lend freely to banks when there is a sudden desire on the part of
depositors to withdraw their funds from banks. To lend freely at other times will
only lead to inefficiency because firms that deserve to fail are bailed out, or
because it results in excessive money growth that stimulates inflation. Indeed, the
monetarist position suggests that if the central bank is able to keep monetary
aggregates growing at appropriate rates, it is unlikely that a lender-of-last-resort
role is even needed to promote the health of the economy. For example,
McCaIlum (1988) takes the position that monetary policy only needs to concern
itself with adherence to a monetarist-like rule which adjusts monetary base growth
for past changes in velocity. In a more recent paper, McCallum (1989) suggests
that pursuance of such a rule would have been enough to prevent the Great17
Depression.3
A corollary of the monetarist view is that the operation of the discount
window may be unnecessary. Open market operations are sufficient to keep the
money supply on its target path and this is all that is needed to keep the economy
functioning well. Using this reasoning, Friedman (1958) advocated abolishment
of the Federal Reserve's discounting operation and more recently Goodfriend and
King (1988) seem to come to a similar conclusion. Goodfriend and King (1988)
dichotomize the activities of the central bank into "monetary policy', i.e.. changes
in the total volume of high powered money which can be entirely carried out with
open market operations, and "banking policy", which involves regular lending and
emergency financial assistance to individual banks and institutions along with
regulatory and supervisory actions. Because they see financial crises as being
essentially monetary in nature, they do not see the need for "banking policy" and
discount lending. Since they consider the regulatory and supervisory activities that
become necessary when there is discount lending by the central bank to be costly,
they lean to elimination of Federal Reserve discount lending.4
The analysis of financial crises in this paper provides some evidence that
the asymmetric information view of financial crises gives a better explanation of
the facts than does the monetarist view. An asymmetric information view of
financial crises, although it sees an important role for bank panics, does not see
them as the only financial disturbances that can have serious adverse effects on the
aggregate economy. Financial crises have effects over and above those resulting
from banking panics, and analysis of such episodes as the stock market collapse
in the 1937-38 period suggests that a financial crisis which has serious adverse
consequences for the economy can develop even if there is no threat to the banking
3Although I am critical here of McCallum's position that monetary policy only needs to
concern itself with adherence to a monetarist-like rule in order to promote economic health, there
are features of McCallum's rule that I find attractive. My criticism is that McCallum's rule does
not specify when the Federal Reserve may need to engage in a lender-of-last-resort role.
4They do hedge their position, however, for they "wonder whether discount lending could
he rationalized under a different criterion:to prevent the disruption costs of widespread
insolvencies associated with temporary interest rate spikes." (Goodfriend and King (1988) p. 18.)
The argument in this paper that disruption costs may indeed be high from widespread insolvencies
provides a rationale for banking policy" even in their framework.18
system. The asymmetric information analysis thus suggests that a lender-of-last-
resort role may be necessary to provide liquidity to nonbanking sectors of the
financial system in which asymmetric information problems have developed.
Furthermore, it suggests that financial disturbances outside of the banking system
in the postwar period have had the potential to have serious adverse effects on the
aggregate economy, and that these adverse consequences have in fact been
prevented only by quick actions of the Federal Reserve to pursue an expanded role
as a lender of last resort.
The asymmetric information interpretation of financial crises given in this
paper thus provides a strong rationale for the following proposition eloquently
stated by Andrew F. Brim mer, a former member of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System: "the Federal Reserve System, as the nation's central
bank, has a major responsibility in the containment of those types of risks which
threaten to disrupt the fabric of the financial system which is so vital to the
economy at large." (Brimmer (1989) p. 15.)
The asymmetric information interpretation of financial crises also provides
a strong rationale for the operation of the discount window. As the analysis of the
Penn Central bankruptcy, the stock market crash of October 1987, and the stock
market crash of October 1929 in Mishkin (1991) indicates, the Federal Reserve
can use the discount window to channel liquidity directly to the sector that is most
in need of it. Without the discount window, the Federal Reserve can only provide
liquidity to a specific sector by providing it to the overall economy using open
market operations. Because this provision of liquidity might be very indirect, a
larger infusion of liquidity may be needed to prevent the financial disturbance from
creating severe asymmetric information problems. Consequently, in order for the
central bank to achieve its objectives it may have to put so much liquidity into the
economy that it would produce substantial inflationary pressure. Havingthe
discount window at its disposal provides the central bank with a delicate tool that
enables it to cope with financial disturbances without promoting inflationary
tendencies.
The operation of the discount window also provides the central bank with
another major advantage in dealing with potential financial crises. Government
bailouts of individual firms have the significant disadvantage that it is likely to19
keep inefficient firms in operation and also encourages excessive risk taking on the
part of firms that expect to be bailed out. In essence, the problemis again one of
asymmetric information because the government is unlikely to be able to separate
out insolvent from temporarily illiquid firms. In addition, political pressures may
influence bailout decisions to the detriment of economic efficiency.5 Thus the
Federal Reserve had justification for not lending directly to Penn Central to
prevent its bankruptcy in June of 1970, even though the Fed was put under strong
pressure to do so by the Nixon Administration.
On the other hand, discount lending enables the central bank to encourage
lending to a sector of the financial system in which asymmetric information has
become a serious problem and yet minimizes some of the efficiency losses from
this lending.Using the discount window enables the central bank to take
advantage of the monitoring and information collection expertise inherent in
individual banks so that lending is likely to be made only to solvent business
enterprises. In other words, the central bank is making use of the banks as
delegated monitors on its behalf.
It is noteworthy that when the Federal Reserve advanced discount loans to
banks lending to customers who needed to role over their commercial paper in the
aftermath of the Penn Central bankruptcy, the banks were told that they would be
responsible for the credit risk involved in this lending.6 The Fed was making it
clear to the banks that they would provide liquidity to prevent systemic risk, but
would not be responsible for idiosyncratic risk. Similarly, when the Fed made
discount advances in order for banks to extend additional loans to their brokerage
firm customers after the stock market crash in 1987, it was made clear that these
customers would have to be considered creditworthy by the banks. The burden
of screening out good from bad borrowers was thus left to individual banks, who
have the expertise to do this properly.7
The sad saga of the Savings and Loans mess bears this out.
6See Brimmer (1989), page 6.
7The discussion above illustrates why I think that the following statement by Goodfriend and
King (1988) is misguided. On page 18 immediately following the quote in footnote 5 they state,
"If such aggregate disruption cost were large enough, temporary transfers to the banking system20
The use of banks as delegated monitors for the central bank during a
financial crisis suggests that the traditional recommendation that the central bank
should lend at a penalty rate when it performs its lender-of-last-resort role might
be problematic. In order to provide banks with the incentives to act as the central
bank's delegated monitor, banks must be able to profit from this activity. Thus
there is a case for subsidizing banks by setting the discount rate below the interest
rate they earn on their loans during a financial crisis. Without this subsidy, the
banks might not be willing to make the necessary loans. The need for delegated
monitors during a financial crisis might thus explain why central banks typically
set their discount rate below market interest rates, which requires them to ration
discount lending. Although monetary economistsS have typically criticized central
banks for setting the discount rate too low and engaging in rationing of discount
loans, there is a partial rationale for this policy. However, it is not clear why
central banks would not obtain the full benefits from banks acting as delegated
monitors by setting the discount rate below market rates only during a financial
crisis and not in more normal times.
that could avoid such costs might be in society's interest. It should he pointed out, however, that
a similar argument could be made for avoiding disruption costs of temporaryinsolvencies
anywhere in the economy. Therefore, acceptance of the criterion for banking policyalone would
need to be based on a demonstration that disruption costs are much larger in the banking sector
than elsewhere." I disagree particularly with the last sentence. Use of the discount window
(banking policy) is especially valuable if disruption costs are larger in the nonhanking sectorthan
in the banking sector. Use of discounting to lend to banks who, in turn, lend to the sectorin
financial difficulty minimizes the adverse selection problem facing a central bank lending directly
to that sector because it delegates information collection and monitoring to individualbanks who
have incentives to do this effectively. Thus discounting helps the central bank to dealwith
systemic risks and not idiosyncratic risks. Bernanke and Gertler (1990) also pointout that
advantages of using financial intermediaries who have information capital tomake loans to a
troubled sector of the economy.
81havealso been in this group. See Mishkin (1992), Chapter 19.21
Conclusion
Theasymmetric information analysis of financial crises explains many
features of these crises which are otherwise hard to explain and shows why
financial crises can have such important consequences for the economy. The
asymmetric information approach indicates that financial crises have effects over
and above those resulting from banking panics. It therefore provides a rationale
for an expanded lender-of-last-resort role which provides liquidity to the financial
system to avoid harmful financial disturbances, even when these disturbances
originate outside of the banking system. It also supports the usefulness of a central
bank having a discounting facility to enable it to efficiently provide liquidity to
financial sectors that most need it. Indeed, it could be appropriate for the central
bank to subsidize discount lending during a financial crisis by setting the discount
rate below market interest rates. However, there are costs to such an expanded
lender-of-last resort role for central banks since it might encourage more risk
taking than is socially optimal. These costs need to be weighed against the
benefits of an expanded lender-of-last resort role in designing appropriate rules for
central bank policymaking.
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